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Summary 1 
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) has emerged as a potentially 2 
important component of the global policy-mix to mitigate climate change. Against a background of 3 
increasing engagement between private-sector entities and conservation organisations, private sector 4 
investment has emerged in REDD+. Despite slow developments at the international scale, there 5 
continues to be private sector interest in REDD+, and continued voluntary investments in REDD+ 6 
projects and initiatives.  7 
In order to better understand possible models for private sector engagement in REDD+, this paper 8 
analyses the motivation of private sector stakeholders to engage in REDD+, the perception of the 9 
potential of REDD+, the critical obstacles to making REDD+ functional and how actors perceive 10 
themselves as part of future REDD+ scenarios.  11 
Based on interviews and a workshop with private sector actors, this paper finds that few expect a 12 
regulatory market for REDD+ to emerge and that credits from the voluntary market have to be tailored 13 
to specific needs. As a carbon offset, REDD+ provides insufficient motivation for investment, 14 
particularly if cheaper alternatives exist. Co-benefits such as biodiversity conservation and community 15 
development are more important when traditional corporate social responsibility (CSR) motivations 16 
play a role.  17 
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Project scale remains important not only for the fact that smaller projects are viewed as offering more 18 
visible benefits to stakeholders but also as a means of having more control over risks on the ground, 19 
posing a challenge for the design of jurisdictional REDD+. Moving towards supply chains that are free 20 
from deforestation offers an opportunity to tackle commodity-driven deforestation. While questions 21 
remain about how such an approach might be integrated into REDD+, it could help address a perceived 22 
gap between private sector understanding of the values of REDD+ and the risks associated with these 23 
values not arising - termed here as a ‘missing middle’.  24 
Introduction   25 
The private sector has been traditionally viewed as being in conflict with organisations aiming to 26 
conserve the environment (Ehrenfeld 2003), but this has shifted with increasing engagement between 27 
private sector entities and conservation organisations (Rose & Colchester 2004; Brockington & Duffy 28 
2011). The idea that firms can benefit society and the environment while making profits, has taken 29 
root; firms across the economy are being held accountable to this by conservation organisations and 30 
consumers (TEEB 2010; Robinson 2012).  31 
Such corporate greening (the discovery by business of the cost, innovation and marketing advantages 32 
of improving environmental performance, Guziana 2013) has grown hand-in-hand with the 33 
development of CSR programmes (Robinson 2012) that emerged as part of the corporate response to 34 
the challenges of environmental damage and climate change (Kolk & Pinkse 2004) but are also often 35 
viewed as important marketing strategies (McWilliams & Siegel 2001; Kitzmuller et al. 2012). Multi-36 
national companies in particular have high incentives to engage in CSR as a way to reduce reputational 37 
risks (Ruggie 2008), with many seeing CSR programmes as effectively a licence to operate (Earthwatch 38 
et al. 2002).  39 
Beyond CSR, opportunities have been identified for businesses to profit directly from engagement 40 
with conservation including the development of new markets for ecosystem services (TEEB 2010). 41 
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Climate change policy, in particular, has witnessed great change in the 2000s, both with respect to 42 
regulations and markets established by governments, as well as voluntary initiatives and largely 43 
unregulated carbon offset markets. With tropical deforestation and forest degradation estimated to 44 
account for approximately 15% of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (van der Werf et 45 
al. 2009), stakeholders, ranging from international organisations and national governments to 46 
conservation organisations and the private sector, have sought to design strategies and policies for 47 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+). 48 
REDD+ was first termed by the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC), with member 49 
countries initially focusing on it as an essential and time-limited contribution to mitigate the impacts 50 
of climate change. In its simplest form, governments and firms would reward tropical countries for 51 
reducing deforestation rates, receiving carbon credits in return. Cap-and-trade schemes like the 52 
European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) were touted as a way of establishing a price for 53 
forest carbon stocks. Since 2005, and in spite of initial high motivation and commitment from many 54 
stakeholders, including national governments, local communities, conservationist NGOs and the 55 
private sector (Palmer & Engel 2009; Nhantumbo 2011), progress in REDD+ has been slow.  56 
In mid-2015, the final framework for REDD+ suggested broad agreement in its overall scope, objectives 57 
and monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) (Meyer 2015). The scope of REDD+ has, however, 58 
increased dramatically from early proposals for a tool targeting reduced deforestation at project scale, 59 
funded by firms purchasing carbon credits, to potentially nation-wide programmes targeting 60 
deforestation, degradation and re-forestation, known as ‘Jurisdictional and Nested REDD+’ (JNR). 61 
Between 2005 and 2015, many policy initiatives and experiments have claimed the mantle of REDD+, 62 
at all scales, involving a range of stakeholders, from Norway’s investments in national programmes in 63 
Indonesia (Lee & Pistorius 2015), to Bosques Amazonicos (a Peruvian company) supporting organic 64 
certification of Brazil nuts in Madre de Dios (Peru) to encourage illegal gold miners to switch activities 65 
(IGES 2013). The critical need to stem tropical deforestation, whether for climate reasons or 66 
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otherwise, is generally agreed upon, but concerns have been raised regarding the potential efficacy 67 
of REDD+ to reduce deforestation, including doubts over cost (Gregersen et al. 2010), infringements 68 
on local community rights (Larson 2011), and debates about how permanent reductions in 69 
deforestation might be achieved (Palmer 2011). This last issue is partially related to how REDD+ might 70 
be implemented on the ground, in terms of the policies, and extent to which these address underlying 71 
drivers of deforestation (see Angelsen 2010). 72 
Many scholars and practitioners nevertheless agree that to work in practice, REDD+ needs to be 73 
implemented at a scale that includes as much of the world’s tropical forest as possible in order to 74 
prevent ‘leakage’, defined as reductions of carbon emissions in one place causing emissions in another 75 
(Atmadja & Verchot 2011). Such scale would require a huge level of financing yet UNFCCC negotiations 76 
have failed to resolve the financing issue due to continuing disagreements among countries about 77 
who should pay and how (Leonard 2015). To date, finance flowing into REDD+ has been dominated by 78 
public funding from richer countries, significantly through Norway’s agreements with Brazil, Indonesia 79 
and Guyana. The private sector has engaged with REDD+ for a wide range of voluntary reasons 80 
including offsetting of emissions, greening of supply-chains and counterbalancing potential future risk 81 
(Corbera & Schroeder 2011). Opportunities to profit have also arisen, for example from trading in 82 
REDD+ credits.  83 
Private sector commitment to REDD+ has been strengthened through the New York Declaration on 84 
Forests, signed by 53 multinational companies and 37 governments, that pledges to halve 85 
deforestation by 2020 and end it by 2030 (UN 2014). A number of multi-nationals have recently 86 
committed to the goal of zero net deforestation, for example, Procter and Gamble have committed to 87 
eliminating deforestation across its palm oil supply chain by 2020 (Shankleman 2014).  88 
Existing literature on private sector involvement in REDD+ frames the issue as a mismatch between 89 
supply and demand. Conservation International (2013) (CI) estimated that REDD+ projects in existence 90 
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represent more than three times current voluntary market demand, while the Global Canopy 91 
Programme (GCP) et al. (2014) estimate demand for REDD+ could be as little as 3% of supply between 92 
2015 and 2020. Despite the continued absence of REDD+ from existing regulatory schemes such as 93 
the EU ETS, the fact that the private sector continues to invest in REDD+ raises the question of what 94 
motivates them to do so. 95 
The term ‘REDD+’ is nebulous and has been used to cover a range of activities concerning forests. Its 96 
scope has grown in the official UNFCCC proceedings from Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 97 
(RED) to include degradation (REDD) and then conservation of standing forests and reforestation 98 
(REDD+). REDD+ is, however, generally used as a catch-all term for projects and policies that are 99 
intended to avoid and reduce deforestation and forest degradation and contribute to regrowth of new 100 
forests. Since it has also grown in scale, initially focusing on project-based approaches before 101 
encompassing jurisdictional approaches at a regional or national scale, this paper adopts a broad 102 
definition, i.e., including projects and policies that fall both inside and outside the official UNFCCC 103 
process, and activities implemented at project and jurisdictional scales, funded both under regulatory 104 
schemes and through voluntary markets (Supplementary Material S1).  105 
Drawing on data from interviews and a workshop with private sector actors, this paper has a number 106 
of key objectives: it examines motivations of firms engaging in REDD+ for their investments and 107 
purchases of credits; decision-making procedures of those currently engaging in REDD+; barriers and 108 
risks that have prevented additional investors from engaging with REDD+; and, how private-sector 109 
stakeholders perceive REDD+ in the future.   110 
Methodology 111 
Views of private sector stakeholders participating in REDD+ were evaluated in a two-step process. In 112 
the first, semi-structured one-to-one interviews, following interview guides (Supplementary Material 113 
S2), were conducted with fourteen individuals. An initial mapping exercise was undertaken of key 114 
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organisations involved in REDD+ located in Europe. The exercise focused on firms currently investing 115 
in REDD+, those investing in other types of carbon offsets, associations representing emitting 116 
industries and REDD+ investors, commodity purchasers and carbon-market traders. Contact was made 117 
with firms, organisations and individuals and interviews were scheduled. Further contacts were made 118 
and interviewed via snowball sampling. 119 
Interviews were conducted between December 2013 and June 2014 at the London School of 120 
Economics (LSE) and across London. Four participants were not available to meet in person so phone 121 
and Skype interviews were conducted.  122 
The focus was on firms that had either provided investment into REDD+ projects or purchased REDD+ 123 
credits, rather than project developers. Motivations and risks associated with developers are different 124 
from those of middle-men looking to purchase credits and sell them on, and different again from those 125 
looking to directly invest in REDD+ projects or purchase credits emanating from such projects. 126 
Therefore, unless explicitly stated the firms, or entities, referred to here are those investing in REDD+ 127 
or purchasing credits.  128 
Questions focused on the potential interest of purchasers in REDD+, motivations of existing REDD+ 129 
purchasers, key decision-makers regarding offsetting in firms, time horizons of firms engaging (or not) 130 
in REDD+ and main barriers for engaging private sector finance in REDD+ (Supplementary material S2). 131 
In a second step a workshop was held under Chatham House rules at LSE in April 2014. Nineteen 132 
participants were involved, drawn from the REDD+ working groups of the Carbon Market Investors 133 
Association (CMIA) and the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA). They included 134 
representatives of project developers, investors, international donors and a range of companies who 135 
provided legal and institutional support to REDD+ projects. While they shared a background similar to 136 
those selected for interview, they were mutually exclusive, in order to allow us to check the validity 137 
of hypotheses developed on the basis of interviews.  138 
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The workshop was structured around three main sessions focusing on: where does REDD+ stand 139 
today; barriers and risks for REDD+; and the future for REDD+ (Supplementary Material S3). Each 140 
session started with a brief presentation that raised findings from interviews, followed by open 141 
discussion to validate findings and raise fresh perspectives. 142 
Results 143 
Motivations of private sector stakeholders  144 
Preparatory and pre-regulatory demand 145 
A key question asked of interviewees was their perception of motivations of existing REDD+ 146 
purchasers. Responses varied, but a conclusion from all interviewees was a dichotomy between those 147 
investing for purely voluntary reasons, and those anticipating REDD+ being used in regulatory markets. 148 
Interviews with two REDD+ market experts (and validated at the workshop) led to the determination 149 
of two different categories of investors in the latter area.  The first were those who faced potential 150 
future regulatory obligations and were looking to engage with REDD+ in order to gain experience. It 151 
was the consensus of participants to the workshop that this type of demand had declined recently due 152 
to declining prospects for REDD+ in regulatory markets. It was raised, both in interviews with emitting 153 
industry associations and at the workshop, that for entities looking to meet regulatory targets, the 154 
main factor determining whether they should engage in offsetting or not was minimising costs.  155 
The second category of investors identified were those companies motivated by resale opportunities 156 
that investing in REDD+ might bring. A workshop participant suggested that this type of investor had 157 
also declined, not only due to the reduced short-term prospects for REDD+ in regulatory markets, but 158 
also due to the experiences of early investors in projects that were perceived to have failed.  159 
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Corporate social responsibility and offsetting  160 
For those companies looking to engage in REDD+ for voluntary reasons the motivations discussed by 161 
REDD+ purchasing interviewees and at the workshop were markedly different from those of pre-162 
regulatory entities. Discussions at the workshop can be succinctly summed up by the phrase used by 163 
a workshop participant when discussing the motivations for financing REDD+: ‘it’s all about the story’, 164 
suggesting that what was crucial was the message that could be communicated to stakeholders. A 165 
workshop attendee with experience in marketing REDD+ credits however, raised the cogent point that 166 
to a number of companies the story of REDD+ was currently unattractive. REDD+ was predominantly 167 
viewed as actors being paid to stop cutting down the rainforest. In the workshop, this prompted the 168 
question raised by one participant of ‘why should I pay someone to stop doing something?’ In the 169 
discussions that followed participants reached the consensus that the idea of paying for something 170 
tangible, like building an eco-lodge, was more attractive. This moves away from the idea of REDD+ as 171 
an ‘emission reduction story’ - the traditional view as observed by a workshop participant, where 172 
REDD+ is perceived merely as a tool to offset emissions - towards the role of co-benefits, for example, 173 
biodiversity protection. While such co-benefits were initially viewed as ‘the cherry on the top for 174 
REDD+’ by workshop participants, i.e. as an additional benefit above and beyond the planned 175 
objective, the discussion concluded that they should now be seen as playing a central role in 176 
investment decisions.  177 
An existing REDD+ purchaser interviewee highlighted that for firms looking to engage as part of their 178 
CSR programmes, the relevance of projects to their overall strategic direction was also important, and 179 
it was this relevance that had helped determine the decision to invest in REDD+ in their organisation. 180 
Such firms looked to projects that offered wide benefits, and fitted within their corporate strategies, 181 
including a consideration of their customers. For example, a key business sustainability leader 182 
interviewee revealed that REDD+ was of particular relevance to firms with supply chains extending 183 
into forest landscapes. 184 
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A more hands-on approach to REDD+, where investors engage directly with the project on the ground, 185 
was reported by two interviewees to have not only helped make REDD+ attractive but also enabled 186 
greater control over risk. For one interviewee, such an approach was motivating firms to make direct 187 
investments in organisations that developed REDD+ initiatives and projects. An example of this 188 
approach is Kering, a luxury goods company, investing into Wildlife Works, a REDD+ project developer, 189 
(Supplementary Material S4).   190 
With regard to the price sensitivity of CSR investors, in analysing interviews and results of the 191 
workshop, it became useful to differentiate between those seeking to use REDD+ credits for CSR only 192 
and those seeking to use it for carbon-neutral CSR (i.e. voluntarily offsetting a company’s emissions). 193 
When the question regarding price sensitivity was raised at the workshop it was the consensus that 194 
prices did not seem to be important for the former, who were reported to often view the purchase of 195 
REDD+ credits, as described by one participant, as a ‘charitable donation’. The latter group, however, 196 
tended to care more about prices; with the overall aim of offsetting their emissions as cheap as 197 
possible. They were only willing to pay higher prices if projects were charismatic and generated wider 198 
public relations (PR) benefits. Such firms, one interviewee ventured, often purchased large volumes 199 
of cheap offsets in order to cover the majority of emissions (e.g. renewable energy or industrial gas 200 
destruction), and a small volume of relatively more expensive REDD+ offsets with co-benefits.        201 
Other potential sources of demand 202 
New pockets of demand have begun to emerge with little or no regulation from government. Instead, 203 
they have developed as a result of direct or indirect action in the private sector, responding either to 204 
internal drivers, such as the desire to move towards green supply chains, or external private sector-205 
led drivers, such as through sustainability indices.  206 
Charitable donations were identified at the workshop as being targeted by REDD+ project developers. 207 
A number of large philanthropic foundations have already been active including the MacArthur 208 
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Foundation and the Clinton Foundation (PwC et al. 2011). For example, the latter has supported 209 
carbon monitoring in countries such as Guyana, while the MacArthur Foundation has a dedicated 210 
programme aiming to minimise deforestation in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo. 211 
Other sources of demand for REDD+ identified by participants included incentives provided by 212 
sustainability targets, such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), that evaluates the 213 
sustainability performance of the largest 2,500 companies listed on the Dow Jones Global Total Stock 214 
Market Index. 215 
In a discussion at the workshop a participant with experience in seeking new markets for REDD+ 216 
reported that they were investigating demand from companies potentially exposed to significant risk 217 
from their investments in carbon-intensive assets that could become stranded if climate or energy 218 
regulation is tightened (‘stranded assets’). The Generation Foundation (2013) identified market forces 219 
and socio-political pressure, along with regulation, as risks that could lead to significant stranding of 220 
fossil-fuel intensive assets. Thus, large institutional investors, such as pension funds, could potentially 221 
diversify their portfolio away from companies holding potentially stranded assets, towards less-risky 222 
opportunities that might thrive in a low-carbon future. The extent to which such opportunities might 223 
include REDD+ would depend on the barriers and risks encountered. 224 
Decision procedures, barriers and risks  225 
Different decision-making procedures and time horizons   226 
Participants were asked who the key REDD+ decision-makers were in their respective firms. For those 227 
engaged in purchasing for CSR, decision-making generally lay with the CSR department, although in 228 
some instances decision-making went all the way to the CEO. Decision-making within CSR 229 
departments implies that finance for REDD+ comes out of general CSR budgets, and workshop 230 
participants highlighted the implications for the time horizon of those investments. With CSR budgets 231 
generally decided annually, investments often fluctuate from year-to-year. One participant responded 232 
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(and there was general agreement subsequently) that, for voluntary purchases for CSR, horizons were 233 
not more than five years and often much shorter, suggesting a severe disconnect between financing 234 
for REDD+ and the typically longer timeframe of many REDD+ projects - rates of carbon sequestration 235 
determine that newly-planted forests take decades to reach maturity.  236 
A new type of REDD+ project from which investors receive not only REDD+ credits but also sustainably-237 
sourced commodities was identified as a key potential future source of demand by a participant 238 
involved in developing projects, with longer time horizons than for CSR projects.   239 
Barriers, obstacles and risks  240 
Preparatory and pre-compliance market demand   241 
Initially raised by an emitting industry association interviewee, and validated at the workshop, was 242 
the perception that many stakeholders, especially those anticipating regulatory markets, view a lack 243 
of regulatory frameworks and a lack of clarity regarding future regulations as a major barrier to 244 
investing in REDD+. Concerns were also raised by both potential purchasers (through emitting industry 245 
associations) and suppliers (through project developers at the workshop) over actual emergence of 246 
regulatory markets and REDD+’s eligibility into such markets. Emerging pilot institutions and 247 
procedures to register projects were perceived by project developers as being too bureaucratic, with 248 
a lack of clarity regarding the types of projects that would be allowed to generate credits and 249 
conditions under which they might be created.  250 
In addition, these investors were deemed by a project developer to be the most price-sensitive and 251 
were also concerned with technical risks relating to REDD+ such as additionality, leakage and 252 
permanence (see Palmer & Engel 2009; Palmer 2011). It was the view of the same project developer 253 
that these risks were likely to be incorporated into criteria that would allow entry of REDD+ into 254 
regulatory markets and thus are likely to form part of the risk-assessment of any regulatory 255 
purchasers.  256 
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Voluntary demand 257 
Risks related to investments in the voluntary market were perceived, by both interviewees and at the 258 
workshop, to be different from regulatory investments. A major barrier, identified by a participant 259 
marketing REDD+ projects, was the current low profitability and expectations of future low 260 
profitability of REDD+ projects that generate revenues from the sale of credits. Price was deemed, in 261 
interviews with market experts, to be less important to investors with more general CSR motivations.  262 
Project failure has great potential to damage the reputations of stakeholders involved, and has been 263 
a common theme of many REDD+ projects to date, for example the Ulu Masen REDD+ demonstration 264 
project in Aceh (Indonesia) (Supplementary Material S5). However, the private sector faces a challenge 265 
in measuring, quantifying and understanding reputational risks associated with REDD+, particularly 266 
given the range of activities, initiatives, countries and contexts. Reducing reputational risk, or at least 267 
helping companies understand and quantify the risk could, in the view of participants, provide further 268 
impetus for companies to scale-up investment in REDD+. There are private sector institutions that 269 
already perform this role to some extent in the form of standards (for example The Verified Carbon 270 
Standard). However, at present these standards are extremely stringent, require huge effort and 271 
finance, and were highlighted by project developers, as a major barrier of entry to the market.  272 
Supply chain greening risks  273 
The potential for REDD+ to find investment from companies looking to improve environmental 274 
performance in supply chains, and promote sustainable agricultural activities, was raised by a 275 
commodity trader interviewee and repeated by others including existing REDD+ purchasers. A 276 
commodity market expert interviewee proposed a mechanism for firms to certify commodities as 277 
being ‘deforestation-free’ via a trading mechanism with other firms, when zero deforestation sourcing 278 
is not possible within their own supply-chains. At the workshop a REDD+ market expert participant 279 
reported that there have been some moves toward such tools through initiatives such as the Round 280 
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Table on Sustainable Palm Oil. These, however, have encountered heavy criticism with accusations of 281 
weak standards and continued deforestation in members’ concessions (Greenpeace 2013). The same 282 
market expert commented that more research was required to exploit the potentially large synergy 283 
between REDD+ and the move toward sustainable supply chains.  284 
REDD+’s missing middle: The difficulty for private sector stakeholders to 285 understand the complexity of REDD+ 286 
The workshop set out to understand two key aspects of the current market: the value or services that 287 
private sector actors obtain from REDD+, and, the risks that these values or services may fail to 288 
emerge. Although participants recognised the importance of both, discussions also raised a further 289 
dimension: a broad lack of understanding of REDD+ in the private sector inclusive of its values and 290 
risks, characterised here as REDD+’s ‘missing middle’. 291 
Informed by discussions at the workshop this missing middle is conceptualised as consisting of three 292 
elements: a lack of understanding of the values that REDD+ can bring to the private sector (highlighted 293 
above with regard to the lack of an attractive story for REDD+); a lack of understanding of the risks 294 
associated with REDD+ (demonstrated above in the discussion regarding difficulties in understanding 295 
and valuing reputational risks); and, a lack of understanding regarding the mapping of risks on to 296 
values.  297 
Future scenarios for private sector involvement into REDD+  298 
In a discussion on the relative attractiveness of different scales of REDD+ projects a participant with 299 
experience of marketing REDD+ commented that CSR purchasers preferred ‘small, nice, cuddly’ 300 
projects, and the ownership, control and PR benefits these can offer in contrast to JNR. In the 301 
discussion that followed a market expert raised the perception that there were fears from some 302 
buyers of working too closely with national or regional governments due to issues of corruption, 303 
further reducing the attractiveness of JNR vis-à-vis project-scale. Countering this, however, was the 304 
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opinion raised by a project developer that firms wanted projects to be embedded in overall JNR 305 
frameworks, as these were more likely to reduce technical issues such as leakage.  306 
Participants of the workshop were almost equally split over the future of REDD+. The first camp held 307 
that under clarified institutional settings and rules, REDD+ could eventually re-gain momentum, while 308 
the second expressed high uncertainty in this regard. Unless a robust framework for regulatory 309 
markets emerges, for instance through JNR, it was the perception of a market expert that private 310 
sector stakeholders preferred to participate in efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and 311 
forest degradation in a narrower context. A point of consensus across the workshop, and also seen in 312 
interviews with market experts, is the likely move away from REDD+ being the focal point of projects 313 
and activities, in the sense that the main motivation of firms investing was carbon credits. Instead, 314 
firms are looking for wider benefits from their investment, with multiple sources of income. There is 315 
an increasing focus on other benefits that arise from projects that aim to reduce deforestation and 316 
generate a return in other ways, such as agro-forestry.  317 
Discussion and Conclusion  318 
REDD+’s brief history has been marked by periods of optimism and pessimism. The current mood in 319 
the private sector is generally pessimistic, with doubts over the emergence of regulatory demand and 320 
supply of credits outstripping demand, reported both by participants and in the literature (CI 2013; 321 
GCP et al. 2014; Forest Trends 2014). While reportedly in decline, the finding that resale opportunities 322 
from investing in REDD+ remain is mirrored by Forest Trends (2012), which found that almost half of 323 
buyers of forest carbon credits (including Afforestation and Reforestation credits through the CDM) 324 
were motivated by either resale or investment or for regulatory or pre-regulatory reasons. In the 325 
voluntary market, recent commitments by companies to reduce deforestation in supply chains (UN 326 
2014) and innovative moves to market REDD+ as a tool to reduce investment-risk offer potential. 327 
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These voluntary actions raise the interesting proposition that at least some investment can be built 328 
on self-reinforcing action from within the private sector, with little or no government involvement. 329 
Consistent with Corbera and Schroeder (2011) this paper finds that investors in REDD+ have different 330 
motivations, from pre-regulatory purchasers to those looking to voluntarily offset emissions, to those 331 
looking to reduce deforestation in supply chains. Firms seeking regulatory credits (or pre-regulatory 332 
experience) were more interested in obtaining low-cost options, whilst those purchasing for CSR were 333 
more interested in co-benefits (see also Forest Trends 2014), and the associated PR. Differentiated 334 
motivations for investing in REDD+ imply policymakers in REDD+ jurisdictions and project developers 335 
need to offer a range of different products, or at least to better understand the differentiated market.  336 
A good understanding of the aims and function of REDD+, along with its values and risks, is lacking 337 
among many private sector investors. Both values and risks differ depending on motivations. But even 338 
where there is an awareness of risks, the private sector is unable to measure and quantify these. 339 
REDD+ lies outside the main activities of most firms, and if they are unable to understand or quantify 340 
specific risks of a particular project or initiative, they may be reluctant to invest. Improved 341 
understanding of the risks involved in different projects and initiatives might help direct capital to 342 
those with a better chance of reaching their aims. This could benefit REDD+ by helping to reduce 343 
demand for riskier projects and initiatives.   344 
This lack of understanding regarding REDD+ (the ‘missing middle’) needs to be overcome if markets 345 
are to develop further. Helping to bridge this missing middle, aiding the private sector to understand 346 
the value that may arise from investing in REDD+ (and the positive impacts that REDD+ may bring to 347 
the environment and also to a company’s image), and to understand (and quantify) the risks that may 348 
be encountered through such investment, could boost private sector investment. Given the 349 
multiplicity of REDD+ projects and initiatives, workshop participants unanimously agreed that there 350 
needs to be movement towards creating unified packages of information regarding REDD+.  351 
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In general, one of the greatest obstacles to innovation, especially in finance, is investors’ natural 352 
resistance to change and new products often fail because investors are reluctant to shift strategy. This 353 
challenge has been met by other products in the environmental sphere such as Green Bonds (Climate 354 
Bonds Initiative 2015). Aversion to change can be even greater when investors are required to assess 355 
new products on the market themselves. Providing suitable, reliable and comparable information 356 
might remove at least one obstacle to greater engagement of private sector finance with REDD+. 357 
Streamlining standards and the variety of certificates on offer could also reduce complexity for private 358 
sector decision-makers and might even help secure senior corporate backing. The recent growth in 359 
REDD+ standards and certificates mirrors the growth in certification schemes and eco-labels for timber 360 
that occurred in the 1990s. Indeed, some of the arguments for standardising timber eco-labels and 361 
certification schemes, for instance, that the diversity of labels can be confusing for consumers (making 362 
it difficult to compare products’ attributes) and weaken labels’ credibility (see Fischer et al. 2005), can 363 
also be applied to REDD+. Some degree of standardisation, under the auspices of the UNFCCC, might 364 
help raise understanding of the potential values and benefits of REDD+ and assist in the 365 
understanding, measuring and quantification of the risks involved.   366 
Given the scale of tropical deforestation, the current level of public and private investment to reduce 367 
it is tiny compared to what is required (CI 2013; GCP et al 2014). This is the case irrespective of whether 368 
REDD+ is implemented in the form of positive incentives (like payments for environmental services) 369 
or reducing deforestation in supply chains so that inputs to production can be certified as being 370 
‘deforestation free’. Yet, at the scale of individual projects or jurisdictions such as Acre in Brazil 371 
(Climate Focus 2013), the private sector can potentially make a difference (see Edwards et al. 2014). 372 
Indeed, where the private sector is part of the problem, in the sense of supplying commodities that 373 
drive forest conversion, it can be argued that it should, as quoted by a workshop participant, 'pay 374 
someone to stop doing something', becoming part of the solution. Supply chains that are free of 375 
deforestation would be a step in this direction and efforts should be made to integrate these with JNR. 376 
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For firms with operations not directly involved in deforestation, the problem with JNR is whether it 377 
will be sufficiently attractive and offer enough of a communicable storyline while providing sufficient 378 
finance to make it work. An institutional structure could be created that attracts a (capped) number 379 
of private sector partners to pool resources, at a size that allows each partner to obtain CSR benefits 380 
and retain sufficient ownership and control. Yet, the extent to which the private sector would be 381 
willing to get involved with a jurisdiction such as Acre in Brazil, whether individually or as part of a 382 
‘club’, remains to be seen. It may require the incorporation of the benefits of REDD+ that appear to 383 
make it attractive to the voluntary market, such as co-benefits and associated PR. But then REDD+ 384 
policy would need to be designed to tackle multiple objectives - likely to be more challenging than 385 
tackling the single objective of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.   386 
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